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This paper provides an outline of my dissertation with the title Coexistence Without 
Common Sense, Akademisk Forlag, Copenhagen 2002. I will strive to keep it as brief and 
simple as possible. 
 
I. Background: the existing sociality 
 
The modern ambiguities. The background for the dissertation has been a number of 
ambiguities that we all experience and that we inevitably have to relate to today. These are 
rather specific ambiguities of the existing social condition which, therefore, seems to point 
in distinct, clearly separated, and rather different directions. I will only be able to stress a 
few of all the ambiguities included in the dissertation. But an important general and very 
brief introduction to all these ambiguities could be the following: 
 On one hand we often claim that we no longer share a set of shared societal 
values: that society in a number of ways seems to tend towards a loss of coherence and 
towards general dissolution; that everything appears to disintegrate, become insubstantial, 
intangible and difficult to perceive of to such an extent that we struggle to find our own 
footing and to comprehend even our own standpoint. In short, the world becomes 
unsurveyable and boundless. On the other hand, however, we can also experience that 
we are closely connected to each other and so closely interwoven that it almost seems 
difficult to breathe and act: that we almost suffocate. 
 On a more personal level, I can perceive myself as a modern individual who 
forms the centre of my own world and feels no obligation to answer to authorities outside 
myself that I do not recognize. I am a free, sovereign, and self-ruling person. At the same 
time I constantly experience that decisions are made for me. My point of departure is 
autonomy, the fact that I am a self-legislating person who passes judgment over my 
surroundings. But at the same time I experience the fact that something outside me has 
legislative power over me. I fall victim of heteronomy and powerlessness. 
 Why is that? Is it a mere result of an ambiguous and complex world? This 
might suffice as an answer. However, my feeling is that the accentuated contradiction 
which we experience between these elements are specific and that they represent 
something which characterizes us today. We seem to vacillate between radically different, 
but not arbitrary, specific possibilities. 
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The existing social bond. The ambiguities we experience have to do with the nature of that 
which ties us together today, with the nature of the existing social bond. There is no 
community or “Gemeinschaft” on which we can rely. No unifying and localizable 
agreement forms the basis of our general interaction. We are not able to point out a 
shared point in which we all become unified, a specific foundation on which we may build 
society. 
 
 
 
Instead, we seem to be unified by coherence or affinity in certain respects. The social 
bond that unifies us is woven of a number of different threads; and each of these threads 
functions as our creation, as constructions that we can pick up and remodel at our own 
convenience. They are temporary and insubstantial. 
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We cannot, however, pick up all of them at the same time. In their 
connectedness, the threads are unavoidable. We cannot obtain a comprehensive view of 
them or confront them en bloc. The existing social bond, therefore, assumes the general 
and unavoidable characteristic of the network. It takes the form of a network within which 
we exist and act. 
This is part of the reason for my choice of the title Coexistence Without 
Common Sense: as a way to emphasize the existence of social relations or social 
exchange which do not rest upon or presuppose a specific common sense or reason. For 
that very reason social reality seems oddly intangible. 
We do not have a shared space. What we do have is a sociality that we are 
entangled in and relate to but without necessarily knowing it in its entirety. This social bond 
ties us together by affecting the way we relate to things: the way we relate to each other – 
and to ourselves. 
 
In spite of its insubstantiality and intangibility the social bond can seem invulnerable and 
enduring. We experience ourselves as being bound together into a manifold 
intertwinedness of which we always already are a part, out of which we cannot extricate 
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ourselves, from which we cannot withdraw, even though we may desire to do so, and 
which has a determining effect on our actions and their consequences. We experience 
ourselves as participants in, and as subsisting in, an intangible yet unyielding fellowship of 
common destiny that we do not seem to be able to control; a fellowship that we can neither 
fathom nor escape. Today’s Leviathan, our eternal worldly social idol, our immortal worldly 
God, binds us all – even its opponents – with fibres of the kind that the Nordic demigods, 
the Aser, once spun to bind the brother of Hel, the Fenris Wolf – that shadowy threat to the 
societies of men and gods. Yet it is a thread of subtle tensile properties, spun out of the 
sound of the footfall of the cat, of women’s beards and of the roots of the mountain. In 
spite of the fact that community in the traditional sense of the word, formulated in terms of 
a fundamental agreement on certain basic intrinsic values, cannot be supposed, we do – 
as a matter of fact – experience a society in the shape of a tight-knit sociality into which all 
of us are inescapably interwoven. 
 
The level of prescription. Initially, I do not pretend to present an exhaustive description of 
the way we actually relate to these issues today. Rather, the study of the social bond is a 
study of our normativity: of the measures that tie us together by affecting social actions 
and social events. 
 Thus, the dissertation represents, in my opinion, not a topical sociological 
analysis but a philosophical investigation. The investigation is concerned with the level of 
prescription. I study the guidelines for the way that we, together with the surrounding 
world, direct ways for us and our world to come into being, emerge and leave our traces. I 
focus on the normativity which is generated through our collaboration and which 
prescribes ways in which we conduct ourselves. 
 Accordingly, one could claim that the pretensions are more limited than in a 
traditional sociological or historical social study. I am not concerned with reality and never 
seek an exhaustive description of our actual conduct – of what we actually do and of what 
actually happens. 
 However, on a different level, the pretensions could be said to be higher since 
this level of prescription not only affects and determines our reality; it also affects and 
determines what we are able to perceive at all, what we are able to imagine – what is 
plausible and what can become real and come into being in a very broad sense. 
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 I am concerned not with reality but with the level of prescription. But the level 
of prescription takes precedence over actuality; it is more important than reality; and it is 
more essential than being. I am concerned with a prescription that has always already had 
its effect before all this becomes a reality. That does not mean that all this is not essential. 
Neither in general, nor to my own study. All this is precisely what I am concerned with and 
try to relate to in the dissertation. 
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II. Access. The historical investigation 
 
To point out that the existing social bond, the bond that ties us together, has the 
characteristics of the network, is to say very little. It merely provides a formal 
characterization. When attempting to provide a more specific description of this bond and 
further define it, one has to explicate some of the different central threads that form part of 
and constitute it. I have done this in each of the four main parts of the dissertation: “Justice 
and its decisions”, “Law and its partition”, “Discipline and its surveillance” and 
“Governmentality and its economy”. 
 Each of these four main parts sheds light on a central element of the existing 
social bond and its characteristics through an historical investigation of their genealogy: an 
investigation of how they have emerged historically and have obtained the characteristics 
that seem to stick to them today. It is a history of articulation, differentiation and 
purification: a history of how different considerations in social conduct which used to be 
implicitly understood have been unfolded, purified and brought to perfection (Naturally, 
these considerations can only be accounted for in retrospect.) 
 
Justice and Law. Throughout most of our history the justice has been the arrangement 
through which we have believed to find the foundation or basis for social exchange from 
the early Greek and Germanic courts at the beginning of historical time until modern 
constitutionalism expressed in a number of constitution proposals shortly after the French 
Revolution, in the French Code Civil (1804) and in the American Constitution. In Denmark, 
codification appears already during the absolute monarchy in the Danish Act of 
Succession (1665) and the Danish Law of King Christian V; and after the revolution of 
1848 in the new constitution. 
 Part I and II of my dissertation, “Justice and its decisions” and “Law and its 
partition”, both treat the court as radical social practices, but in completely different forms. I 
will briefly outline the contents of these sections of the dissertation by means of a number 
of central key words. 
 
 11
Part I. Common accusative justice and customary law. The legal practice that we might 
call common accusative justice is part of a sociality characterized by rivalry. It is activated 
when someone feels that they are not given a fair deal, believes to have been humiliated, 
or when disputes become unmanageable. In these instances, one can step forward 
publicly and insist on one’s rights, and hence a legal controversy and litigation begins. 
 Thus accusative justice is conflictual justice but it is also ritual justice in that 
the process follows a set of ritually established guidelines. It is a legal trial of strength 
which can be settled by means of different legal tests, for example whether or not one 
party is willing to take an oath, or whether he can find twenty good men to back him up. 
This can be exemplified with an episode from The Iliad. Menelaos has accused Antilochos 
of having wrongfully won a race, a competition, by reckless driving: of having won on an 
irregular basis; and thus he asks him to take an oath. The purpose is to induce a decision, 
a conviction, in the particular case. 
 Accusative justice was also based on customary law. This law presupposed 
and appealed to a preceding agreement in individual settlements. They found their place 
within this universe. The old Danish world lagh, for example – a word that both lov (Danish 
for law) and law derive from – was originally in the plural and signified the already defined 
and established issues: the already established, that which has been laid down in the right 
way. Accordingly, law pertained to well-established facts. However, law per se was implicit 
or presupposed. The law in general was never formulated in words or presented as such. 
Law was only present in the sentences pronounced, in the decisions of single cases. 
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Part II. Law. In the course of the Middle Ages, however, one notices beginning efforts to 
submit and formulate the basis for legal decisions by formulating the underlying general 
laws and making them public to the world.  
 Originally, this development was largely under the guidance of the Roman 
church in an attempt by the Holy See to establish itself as a counter-power to the secular 
rule and its forms of dominance by founding itself in terms of laws. It was an effort to 
establish a new kingdom of a hitherto unforeseen kind based on law. Gregory VII 
formulates these efforts in his Dictatus papae: “Only he [the Pope, S.R.] can lay down new 
laws”. The Law thus constructed becomes the general mode of appearance of, and basis 
of justification for, the Roman Catholic Church. 
 Subsequently, this approach is assumed by the more centralized royal power 
that also appears at the end of the Middle Ages and defines itself against the network of 
feudal structures of dependence. The Assizes of Ariano, promulgated by Roger II of Sicily 
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in 1140, represents an early example of this development; whereas the German Emperor 
Frederic II as king of Sicily published the much more comprehensive Liber augustalis in 
1231. On can trace the same development in France from the middle of the 13th century 
and a little later in England. The monarchy asserts itself against feudalism – with its 
ongoing disputes and mutual state of dependence – as a central power by formulating 
itself in terms of law.  
 Law, thus, begins to make itself felt and has a fundamental impact on 
sociality. Reinterpreted in this new way, it is characterized by a number of distinctive 
qualities. Prescriptive laws take the form of general restrictions or prohibitions, of 
commands pertaining to everybody that prescribe for people to do this, or more often, not 
to do that. In this way they establish a distinct and generally binding partition between what 
is prohibited and what is permitted. At the same time they institute and manifest a general 
representative order. They define what is right for people to comply with. 
The modern Western European territorial states (and later nation states) rest 
on such an order in as far as these territories become centred on a capital and a supreme 
sovereign authority. The development, thus, may be described as a ‘capitalization’ of the 
territory through law. At the same time, the earlier persistence of conflicts is forced out of 
sociality with the result that society becomes neutralized or pacified: It becomes centred 
on and based upon the peace of Law. In return, the persistence of conflicts, the 
conflictuality, becomes isolated and concentrated at the national frontiers where it is 
intensified and develops into a permanent state or condition of war in the Hobbesian sense 
of the term: into an ever present “inclination” or “disposition” “to contend” conflicts “by 
Battell [battle]” (Leviathan, Part I, Chap. XIII). 
This results in the development of the state in the modern sense of the word; 
and this modern state based on the rule of Law introduces a general hierarchisation and 
axiomatisation in society. By the end of the Thirty Years’ War, this development is already 
at a rather advanced stage. “La Fronde”, which was suppressed by Louis XIV between 
1648 and 1650, was an expression of the last serious attempt by the high nobility to revolt 
against the peace established by Law in France. 
 In short, part II of my dissertation describes the way in which modern 
constitutional society comes into being through the presentation of Law. This development 
brings on a general transformation of social interaction so that it comes to rest on and be 
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formed by a specifically defined basis which draws a distinct line between what is 
permitted and what is prohibited. And at the same time the sentencing is formalized, which 
replaces the substantialisation previously used. 
 
Reinterpreted in this way, Law and justice still largely inform our notions of social 
coherence and community. As stated, we still tend to conceive of coherence and 
communality as the merging at a common point, as agreement about a particular basis on 
which we rest. Moreover, our notions of rules and regularity are coloured by the law. The 
minute we describe a regularity, we tend to formulate it as a result of or as agreeing with 
general rules and find it difficult to conceive of community and regularity in any other way. 
 In short, the law has evolved into a modern metaphysics which tends to 
materialize everywhere and appears self-evident and inevitable. The law represents its 
own source. It is an entity which reappears in all human activity and comprehension.  
 
Part III. Discipline. The next part of my dissertation, “Discipline and its surveillance” 
describes the origins, dissemination, and character of the disciplinary practice. 
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 Shortly after the purchase in 1662 by Colbert of the tapestry workshops in 
Paris for the king, Louis XIV, an edict is issued with the provisions for a new school which 
is to be built in affiliation with the workshops. The edict maintains the principles for craft’s 
apprenticeship. Upon the establishment of an apprenticeship contract the student enters 
into a global state of dependence on a master. After six years the students complete their 
training with one final test in order to justify, en bloc, their acquirement of a certain level of 
knowledge. If they pass, they can subsequently establish themselves as independent 
masters.  
 An edict issued in 1737 concerning the training of tapestry weavers with 
regard to drawing classes indicates, however, that the education is undergoing radical 
changes. The edict is substantially more detailed with regard to the process and form of 
the training. It stipulates a standard of two hours of teaching on every workday. Each class 
begins with a call-over of all the students in order to register the absent students, and the 
students are divided into three different classes depending on their level of proficiency. 
Moreover, the students were to hand in individual assignments on a regular basis. The 
best drawings were rewarded; and the total of the delivered products allowed for an 
evaluation of the relative progress of each student and his or her placement in relation to 
the other students. 
 These changes indicate an overall shift in the dissemination of knowledge and 
teaching relations. The focus is no longer on the teaching and representation to an 
undifferentiated mass of privileged and authoritative knowledge. 
 On the contrary, there is a beginning tendency to divide the schooled mass 
into groups of students of equal proficiency and to place these groups in separate rooms. 
Thus arises the modern school class: a group of students that is homogenous because the 
students partake in the same education and have a similar level of knowledge. This 
division is followed by a division within the class. The physical space of the class room is 
divided into a system of separate cells so that each student becomes tied to his or her own 
little space which allows for the teacher to simultaneously address the individual student 
and maintain a comprehensive view of the class. Moreover, in the 1600s, the schools 
begin to register the delivered performances in order to establish a form of ranking. In 
general, there is an increasing focus on definitions of what the students should be doing, 
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and when, and the stipulations are monitored. In this way, the school seeks to optimise the 
way students utilize their time. 
 The purpose of this kind of regulation is to enforce a predefined gradual 
genesis, a coherent development, in which the later steps builds on previous ones. It 
establishes a continual accumulating notion of progress; and the goal of this progress is to 
obtain a condition where the individual has developed specifically selected abilities as 
completely as possible. Unlike the irregular qualitative shifts of the apprenticeship, these 
changes represent the construction of an evolutionary timeline in the shape of a composed 
and detailed linear progression towards an ideal goal. Earlier, the purpose of the school 
had been to guide and instruct pupils, but now the school becomes a place, in short, for 
pupils to become educated by exposing them to training and disciplining. 
 The changes perceived between 1662 and 1737 bear witness to long-term 
changes in teaching relations. Discipline and surveillance are introduced. This introduction 
brings on the shift from the apprenticeship to the modern school. However, one can 
observe the concurrent introduction of discipline into warfare, for example with the 
establishment of military drills and modern war techniques. As a result, the modern 
standing army comes into being. And as a parallel development, the discipline is 
introduced into production relations with the result that the trades, which previously had 
been organized around guilds, are transformed into modern industrial production – with an 
analytical division of the production process and introduction of a division of labour. This 
leads to the modern manufacture or factory. 
 Over time, discipline and surveillance becomes widely diffused. Around 1800 
these concepts have become so all pervading and general that society begins to define its 
punitive measures around discipline. Imprisonment replaces the public torture of earlier 
times (as known from the public executions through torments on the scaffold) as the 
punitive measure par excellence. This leads to the appearance of the modern prison. 
Imprisonment is a disciplinary punishment: an effort to reintegrate and resocialize the 
criminal by segregating him from the rest of society and subjecting his life to a disciplinary 
regime. Formally speaking, the nature and purpose of imprisonment is training and 
disciplining, even though it is not always very successful in doing so. 
 Generally speaking, discipline does not subject us to particular general 
provisions which we have to comply with at all times as in the case of the law. Instead, 
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time begins to play a role. Through discipline our lives become subject to particular 
limitations which constitute a process of learning in which our lives become directed 
towards a not yet realized regulative or ideal norm: a norm which we may never succeed 
in reaching, but which we relate to at all times – and to which we become related. This 
movement allows us to increasingly come into our own as the distinctive individuals that 
we are. 
 
Part IV. The logic of the welfare society. The next part of my dissertation, “Governmentality 
and its economy” describes the formation, dissemination, and character of the logic of the 
modern welfare society. 
 In the pursuit of a general – and maybe somewhat hasty – notion of this logic, 
one could turn to a phenomenon like modern terrorism as it shows itself in cases like the 
September 11 attacks on New York City. Why is it that we respond so strongly to this 
event? In fact, on general socioeconomic consideration, the fact that two Boeing aircrafts 
fly into some skyscrapers in Manhattan poses a rather small problem. And to the extent 
that this is an exceptional phenomenon, the situation does not represent a serious security 
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problem to us as citizens at large. The risk for me as a citizen to be struck by this kind of 
phenomenon is far more minimal than the risk of me being hit by a car tomorrow, which 
means that, more than likely, we do not react to terrorism on the basis of a real and 
concrete threat to our individual lives. 
 A brief characterization of the phenomenon of terrorism could present it as a 
political form of action which seeks to shock the existing society through sudden acts of 
violence that strike unexpectedly and anywhere, even in the safest of places. The terrorist 
acts manifest a fundamental problem: Not only in nature but also in social relations do 
violent contrasts and violent conflicts break out which we cannot completely avert and 
secure ourselves against. Terrorism provokes fear and anger in society’s leaders and 
citizens alike as a unifying emblem of an invincible violence and insecurity which, 
nevertheless, has to be fought with all means. 
 In this way, terrorism obtains a central position in our public space and causes 
strong and almost hypersensitive reactions precisely because it contests and activates on 
a symbolic level the existing social agreement, or ‘contract’, that traverses and becomes 
re-established in the institutions and social interaction of the welfare society. It affects and 
activates a mutual and diffuse agreement of care and welfare. This agreement provides 
the promise of continual care for the welfare of all of us and each of us; and in return, we 
all, and each of us, accept a rather detailed level of interference in our lives. 
 The welfare contract is embedded in a number of specific welfare-producing 
practices which have evolved over a long period of time and of which I shall only mention a 
few: Because people become ill, we have constructed health services; because accidents 
happen and damages occur and individuals or groups of people need to be indemnified, 
we have established insurance companies; and because people lose their jobs, we have 
created unemployment funds. 
These practices, e.g. the insurance practice, seek to the greatest possible 
extent to take extraordinary events into account and allocate the responsibility for them. 
This is done by simultaneously relating the seemingly random events and adjusting them 
in relation to a general logic inherent in them, that is, in relation to a reasonable average. 
The event is seen in relation to a reality and to its inherent normativity in the shape of an 
average, or normality. 
 19
 
Today, we have established a consensus about a leader’s responsibility of contributing to 
increasing the common welfare as well as the welfare of the individual. Leadership has 
become servile; it exists for the benefit of all and each of us. And there is a consensus of 
opinion that it is obvious for leaders to define their role in a way so that they optimise their 
own welfare as well as considers and contributes to the welfare of the contexts that they 
partake in. Modern terrorism shakes and contests this mutual agreement. However, this 
does not cause us to abandon the agreement, quite the reverse. The challenge reactivates 
and strengthens the agreement. 
 Currently we see the outlines of an international political system based on the 
welfare agreement. This manifests itself in a number of concrete political and military 
actions around the world in places where we detect threats: the Balkans, Afghanistan, 
possibly Iraq – who knows? These political and military actions are perceived and 
presented as police actions. Their purpose is to detect and eliminate threats against 
humanity, either primarily in the shape of the humanity of the local population as in the 
Balkans, or primarily in the shape of our own humanity as in Afghanistan. 
 20
 Unfortunately, I only deal with the logic of the welfare society in a very limited 
and superficial manner in Coexistence without common sense; but I plan to continue these 
investigations. 
 
Part V: Negotiation. Lately, another fundamental practice has begun to manifest itself. 
Embedded in a number of societal institutions and social conventions is a perceptible and 
unavoidable commitment to negotiation: a practice of negotiation. 
 The exchange that takes place in this negotiation practice includes values and 
morality not as a basis but as input to be processed. The participants constantly seek to 
advance a range of diverging values and standards of action; and only within the 
negotiation game is the question of the proper division and connection among them 
answered. The interaction of the negotiation does not represent a space for shared values 
because the exchange puts values at stake; they are the subject of negotiation. Values 
and morality do not have the character of a unifying metaphysics. Rather, the participants 
seek to gain control over each other by simultaneously re-establishing the basis for social 
interaction and the direction of this interaction. And by this simultaneous attempt to control 
the acts of others and to recreate reality the participants become mutually prescribing 
while recreating the social space. Whereas the welfare logic is ordered around a specific 
reality and its normality, the dissemination of the negotiation procedures implies an 
obvious mutual prescribing which introduces a re-artificialisation of this reality. 
 I do not treat the negotiation practice independently in my dissertation, but I 
have analysed it before, for example in the article “Reorganizing Society.”1 
 
                                                 
1 Sverre Raffnsøe and Ove K. Pedersen: “Reorganizing Society”, in Karlsson & Jonsson (ed.): Law, Justice and the 
State, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Berlin 1996. 
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III. Conclusion. Characteristics of the existing sociality 
 
The below drawing incorporates the layers I have outlined in one simple figure: 
 
I hope it provides a sense of the kind of social bond I have tried to illustrate: on one hand, 
the complexity, unsurveyability and boundlessnes that we face; and on the other hand, the 
structural interconnectedness that we find ourselves in. 
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The interconnectedness and complexity have grown over a long period of time. However, 
we can see the outlines of some general and fundamental shifts through the emergence of 
the general practices which I describe. 
 
The immanence and de-substantialisation of normativity. Normativity becomes 
increasingly immanent through the development described in the dissertation. This is not 
the same as saying that it disappears; rather, it becomes increasingly widespread; An 
increasing amount of responsibilities and an increasing amount of forms of responsibility, 
but the character of the responsibilities changes.  
 As the original transcendental becomes more and more 
immanent, however, we can trace a radical shift with regard to metaphysics: In accusatory 
and customary justice it was confidently presupposed. In the universe of the Law it was 
formulated and presented. In discipline it was transferred to an anticipated future as a goal 
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we anticipated and strove to realize. With the rationality of the welfare governance, 
normativity is designated with the characteristics of a normality, an average that everybody 
relates to and creates through apparently individual and unique actions. In the practice of 
negotiation we all act mutually prescribing. 
This implies a concurrent de-substantialisation: the fact that the substance, 
that which seems unchangeable, transcendent, or sublime in what we do, the untouchable, 
disappears. It becomes still more difficult to refer to a permanent being that can be 
presupposed. Metaphysically speaking, that which is – that is ‘being’ – increasingly obtains 
the characteristics of interaction; it becomes something that we create amongst us and a 
score that we settle between us. Being has become a human creation which is 
increasingly the subject of negotiation. 
 
Humanity and the dissemination of sovereignty. As a part of this development towards 
greater immanence, humanity is put at the centre and raised to the last and absolute 
(judicial) authority. This development could be described as a growing deification of 
humanity. But it could also be described as a dissemination of sovereignty. Sovereignty no 
longer merely refers to or is limited to the highest authority in social life which is free and 
can freely rule and define society above the rest of us. We have all become sovereign 
individuals, self-dependent and autonomous entities who not only have the ability to 
pronounce judgement on our surroundings but who are responsible for doing so. 
 
Provisionality and frailness. This produces a new form of provisionality. Anything we 
experience appears as a human creation which demands to be addressed and to which 
we have to relate as a simple suggestion. And at the same time, a new frailness emerges. 
With the decline of the transcendental and with the deification of humanity, everything 
appears as pure human creation which cannot refer to anything deeper and more 
substantial. And the human constructions, the thoroughly humanised universe, appear as 
a creation with nothing else of a more fundamental nature to fall back upon. Thus, there is 
a growing sense of lack of fixed points of reference, an increasing manifestation of a 
boundlessness and groundlessness. 
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Inclusion and subsumption. This development, however, is counteracted by another shift. 
The immanent and humanised universe that I describe seems to increasingly prove 
unlimited. It displays an increasing capacity for inclusion: for the re-integration and re-
assimilation of that which appears to be on the borderline and about to fall beyond. Thus, 
the in-substantiality, groundlessness, frailness and provisionality become counteracted by 
an increasing capacity for subsumption: for adaptation and subordination of differences – 
not in the name of a defined universal, not in the name of anything given, but in the name 
of the different working logics of which I have described some. 
  
The norm of change. Under the general heading of the norm of change, we might further 
comprise a range of pronounced characteristics of the modern sociality which, however, I 
will only conclusively address in short entries.  
1.Modernity has been discussed as an uncompleted project: a program which 
presents us with the task of completing it in order for us to become truly autonomous and 
enlightened beings in control of our own lives. However, following the line of thought I have 
outlined here, we might conclude that modernity from its beginning and in essence was 
and will continue to be an uncompleted and unfinishable project. Modernity represents a 
project which is inherently abortive and deviates from its apparent intentionality.  
 But this does not cause us to give up the project. On the contrary, it means 
that it has to be continually reassumed in order to reintegrate or re-assimilate that which 
seems to be escaping it. From the beginning, the abortive nature of the project is an 
integral and inherent part of it as an invitation to its continuation. By virtue of its abortive 
nature, modernity continually calls for more of itself. It requires more – not of the total 
repetition, not of the very same, but of the similar. 
2.In this context, we might also observe change and adaptability as something 
characteristic of today. We often present and perceive this demand for continual 
development and readjustment as an external “natural” condition to which we are subject. 
But in my opinion, and if we investigate the emergence of the phenomenon, it is not a 
condition but a normativity that we are subject to. 
 There is a need for a Copernican turn in the analytical method since these are 
demands which we are both subject to and have created ourselves. It is a historically 
created social fact. Change has come into its own and begun to appear ‘as such’ through 
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modernity – both as an obligation and a possibility, as ‘freedom’ and ‘necessity’. However, 
this is a supplementary history which deserves more thorough attention. 
3. In any case, today the continual reintegration and change appears to 
manifest itself in a continuously repeated movement of suspension and mediation. In that 
sense, we have all become common Hegelians: We strive to repeat, reintegrate and 
change our failures in a continuous movement of “Aufhebung”. But this does not make 
them disappear: instead, it means that the failures manifest themselves in the same way, 
only at increasingly higher levels, creating a never-ending spiral. 
 
4. As emphasized at the end of my foreword of the dissertation, the continual efforts to 
suspend tragedy in human existence do not lead to its extinction. It means that tragedy 
remains present, only in a different way, in a suspended form, that is, in a displaced or – 
ultimately – historical form.  
 As an example, this becomes obvious in our relationship with death. In the 
memento mori of the Middle Ages we were still, at least to an extent, able to dance on the 
grave of death and commemorate its presence. Today, we seem to avert our face 
whenever we are confronted with or consorting with death in an effort to eliminate it: to 
suppress or at least postpone it. But death, too, – at least hitherto – returns to manifest 
itself on an even higher level, ever more sublime, as in the endless modern project of the 
health system. In modernity we all become nurses for each other and cure ourselves to 
death. 
 In the second half of the 18th century when the outline of the present human 
condition was drawn, Goethe sensed this and told Frau Stein: “Ich halte es für wahr, daß 
die Humanität endlich siegen wird, nur fürchte ich, daß die Welt ein großes Hospital und 
einer des anderen humaner Krankenwärter werden wird.” (“I believe that humanity and 
humanism will eventually prevail, but I fear that at the same time the world will turn into a 
big hospital and we into one of the other humane wards.”) 
 
 
Foucault and the dispositive analysis. In my exposition I have focused mainly on 
presenting my argument and the issue itself (or the ‘object’ of the analysis) not as it exists, 
but as it reveals or unfolds itself in the dissertation. But for the sake of 
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comprehensiveness, I should say a few words about the method of approach – and about 
the approach to the approach. 
The dissertation represents a dispositional analysis. And this approach has 
largely been unfolded with inspiration from Michel Foucault. In the works of Michel 
Foucault one finds an analysis of the way social dispositives develop through our social 
interaction and come to define - or organise – what we are able to do. Moreover, one finds 
a range of concrete historical analyses that I have further interpreted and built upon. 
However, the Foucault whom I chose to build upon is also very much a thinker 
which does not simply exist but emerges in the dissertation. This Foucault has been the 
subject of some very important reformulation, modification, and grafting – to make his 
thought correlate with my concerns and my objectives. 
